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█ Abstract The problem of free will is deeply linked with the causal relevance of mental events. The caus-
al exclusion argument claims that, in order to be causally relevant, mental events must be identical to phys-
ical events. However, Gibb has recently criticized it, suggesting that mental events are causally relevant as 
double preventers. For Gibb, mental events enable physical effects to take place by preventing other men-
tal events from preventing a behaviour to take place. The role of mental double preventers is hence simi-
lar to what Libet names free won’t, namely the ability to veto an action initiated unconsciously by the 
brain. In this paper I will propose an argument against Gibb’s account, the causal irrelevance argument, 
showing that Gibb’s proposal does not overcome the objection of systematic overdetermination of causal 
relevance, because mental double preventers systematically overdetermine physical double preventers, 
and therefore mental events are causally irrelevant. 
KEYWORDS: Free Will; Free Won’t; Metaphysics; Mental Causation; Double Prevention. 
 
█ Riassunto La metafisica del libero arbitrio: una critica al veto cosciente come duplice inibizione – Il problema 
del libero arbitrio è intimamente legato alla rilevanza causale degli eventi mentali. Secondo l’argomento 
dell’esclusione causale si afferma che gli eventi mentali, per essere causalmente rilevanti, debbano essere iden-
tici a quelli fisici. In tempi recenti Gibb ha avanzato l’ipotesi che gli eventi mentali hanno rilevanza causale in 
quanto duplici inibitori. Secondo Gibb gli eventi mentali permettono il verificarsi di effetti fisici, impedendo 
che altri eventi mentali inibiscano il verificarsi di un certo comportamento. Il ruolo di duplice inibitore degli 
eventi mentali è quindi simile a quanto Libet chiama veto cosciente, ossia la capacità di posizione di veto nei 
confronti di un’azione inconsapevolmente avviata dal cervello. In questo articolo intendo proporre un ar-
gomento contrario all’approccio di Gibb, l’argomento dell’irrilevanza causale, in cui si sostiene come la pro-
posta di Gibb non riesca a superare l’obiezione della sistematica sovradeterminazione della rilevanza causale 
dal momento che gli eventi mentali come duplici inibitori sovradeterminano sistematicamente quelli fisici e 
quindi gli eventi mentali sono causalmente irrilevanti. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Libero arbitrio; Veto cosciente; Metafisica; Causazione mentale; Duplice inibizione. 
 

 
█ Introduction 
 
FREE WILL IS ONE OF the most ancient and 
debated problems of philosophy. It is at the 
centre of our conception of responsibility, 
and is deeply linked with the causal relevance 
of mental events. Not every action is free: 
traditionally, two conditions are thought to 
be necessary for a free action. First, the prin-
ciple of alternative possibilities claims that 
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being free requires the ability to do otherwi-
se, i.e. at least two different courses of action 
should be available for each free choice. If a 
magician hypnotises me and makes me bark 
like a dog, my barking is not the result of a 
free decision, because I could not have done 
otherwise. Second, the condition of autode-
termination or “control” requires that the 
mental states (thoughts, desires, beliefs, etc.) 
of the subject must be causally relevant for 
the outcome of the action. This condition 
distinguishes decisions that are taken rand-
omly from decisions coherent with the 
reasons and the desires of the subject. 
According to illusionists, sceptics and hard 
determinists, the principle of alternative pos-
sibilities is impossible to satisfy in a determi-
nistic world, since in such a word the state of 
the universe at a certain time is necessarily de-
termined by the conjunction of the laws of na-
ture and the state of the universe at a previous 
time, so that no alternative course of action is 
actually possible. Traditionally, the experi-
ments on conscious will performed by the 
neuroscientist Benjamin Libet1 have been ta-
ken to support the view that, if decisions are 
reached unconsciously by the brain and in ad-
vance of subjects’ awareness, then the princip-
le of alternative possibilities can never be sa-
tisfied. However, contrary to this interpretati-
on, Libet2 claims that even if there is experi-
mental evidence against freedom, free will can 
be preserved in the form of the subject’s abili-
ty to inhibit unconsciously originated actions, 
employing the so-called free won’t. 
Other scholars have proposed accounts of 
free will that reject the principle of alternative 
possibilities. In particular, the proponents of 
the source models of control claim that autode-
termination is sufficient for actions to be free, 
allowing agents to be morally responsible for 
their conduct.3 According to these authors, as 
long as the subject’s action arises from her 
mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs, etc.), 
she is a genuine source of her action, indepen-
dently of the deterministic nature of the 
world. Sure enough the subject is not the ulti-
mate source of her action, but for compatibi-
lism this form of autodetermination is suffi-
cient to ensure free will and moral responsibi-
lity. As I will argue, source models of control 
rest on the implicit metaphysical assumption 
that mental events are causally relevant as 
(mediated) sources of actions, and this claim 
is problematic because the causal efficacy of 
mental events has been criticized by the causal 
exclusion argument. 
Recently, Sophie Gibb has defended the 
causal relevance of mental events claiming 
that free won’t represents a case of mental 
double prevention.4 This new approach is 
original and promising, and in this paper I 
will assess Gibb’s theory, focusing on both 
the strengths and possible weaknesses. 
In the first section of this article I will 
present Libet’s theory of free won’t. In the 
second and third sections I will present 
Gibb’s criticism to the causal exclusion ar-
gument5 and Gibb’s theory of mental double 
preventers. In the fourth section I will raise 
an argument against Gibb’s account of the 
relevance of mental events as double preven-
ters, that I will call the causal irrelevance ar-
gument. I will argue that the critique of the 
closure principle based on double prevention 
is fruitful and worth developing, but that it 
doesn’t lead to a better ground for explaining 
the causal relevance of mental events, and 
that Gibb’s theory of mental double preven-
tion might rather be a useful ground for a 
compatibilist account of free will. 
 
█ Determinism, free will, and free won’t 
 
The contemporary debate on free will has 
recently received new nourishment from 
cognitive neuroscience. Sceptical positions 
about free will have been reinvigorated by a 
particular interpretation of the experiment 
conducted by the neurophysiologist Benja-
min Libet.6  
In his famous experiment, Libet wanted to 
examine the temporal relationship between 
the decision to perform a motor action and 
the cerebral activity underlying this decision. 
Libet asked the experimental subjects to look 
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at a clock showing a moving dot, relax, and 
wait for the urge to move their wrist. The sub-
jects had to decide freely and without prepa-
ration to move their wrist, noticing the posi-
tion of the dot on the clock at the moment in 
which they became aware of their decision. 
In the meantime, Libet recorded specific 
brain activities of the subjects with an EEG 
(electroencephalogram), and the precise ti-
ming of the final movement with an EMG 
(electromyogram). 
Notably, Libet discovered that the so-
called readiness potential, a negative brain po-
tential originating in the supplementary mo-
tor area (SMA) during motor preparation, 
preceded the subjects’ conscious decision to 
move their wrist by 350 milliseconds (on 
average). This result saw many draw the con-
clusion that the brain unconsciously makes 
the decision before the subject becomes a-
ware of it, that the subject’s decisions are de-
termined by unconscious processes, and that 
free will is just an illusion.7 The general idea 
is that actions are free only if we can decide 
in advance what we intend to do, and then 
our intention is translated into action by 
brain processes and neural impulses. But 
since Libet’s experiment shows that decisions 
are unconsciously determined in advance, 
one is brought to conclude that subjects’ de-
cisions are always determined by previous 
neural activities. If so, the subject is never ab-
le to do otherwise, and therefore the first 
condition of a free action, the principle of al-
ternative possibilities, is never satisfied. 
Even if this interpretation has gained mo-
re and more consensus during the years, Li-
bet draws a different conclusion from the ex-
periment, arguing that the results leave hope 
for a theory of free will.8 In fact, even if the 
subject becomes conscious of the decision to 
act only 350 milliseconds after the appearing 
of the readiness potential, this conscious a-
wareness precedes the outcome of the action 
(i.e. the movement of the wrist) by approxi-
mately 200 milliseconds. In this time the sub-
ject still has the opportunity to stop the ac-
tion, exercising her capacity to veto.  
Even if the subject feels the urge to move 
her wrist and she is planning to do so, imme-
diately before the action she might decide to 
stop the movement, inhibiting the motor 
preparation that would have caused the ac-
tion. Libet concludes that even if we are not 
endowed with free will, our actions are not 
completely determined because we possess 
free won’t. Hence, to a certain extent, the fact 
that our actions are not completely deter-
mined would preserve free will by maintai-
ning the subject’s ability to do otherwise. 
 
█ The causal exclusion argument 
 
Other attempts have been made to main-
tain agents’ freedom even without alternative 
possibilities, grounding free will exclusively 
on the condition of autodetermination.9 
Classical compatibilism claims that an agent 
is free even if she cannot do otherwise, as 
long as her mental states (reasons, beliefs, in-
tentions, desires, etc.) play a relevant role in 
the determination of the action, i.e. if the 
condition of autodetermination is satisfied. 
Notably, Frankfurt has provided a com-
pelling argument for this claim.10 In Frank-
furt’s example, a rational subject (Jones) has 
decided to perform a particular action. So-
meone else (Black) wants Jones to perform 
the same action. However, in order to obtain 
what he wants without showing his hand, 
Black waits until the moment in which Jones 
takes his decision, planning to intervene only 
if Jones decides to do otherwise from what 
Black wants him to do. There is a variety of 
possibilities regarding Black’s means of in-
tervention: he might threaten Jones and 
force him to act the way he wants, he might 
hypnotise him, give him a potion, or manipu-
late him with a brain-stimulation device.  
However, Frankfurt wants us to concentra-
te on the case in which Jones, by his own will, 
decides to act in the way Black wants him to, so 
that Black does not need to intervene at all. 
Frankfurt argues that in this case Jones cannot 
do otherwise (because had he decided to do 
otherwise, Black would have intervened, for-
The Metaphysics of Free Will 
 
123 
cing him), but nevertheless Jones is free and 
responsible for the result of his action, because 
it is autodetermined (in fact Black doesn’t have 
to intervene). The example aims to show that 
there can be free will (and moral responsibility) 
without alternative possibilities. 
Sceptics usually resort to Libet’s results to 
claim that if our brain decides in advance 
then we cannot do otherwise, and therefore 
there is no free will. Clearly, the rejection of 
the principle of alternative possibilities might 
seem a good basis for claiming that, even in 
the light of the results of Libet’s experiments, 
that conflict with it, agents possess free will. 
However, this move of grounding free will 
completely on autodetermination is not un-
problematic, because brings us to confront 
the problem of the mental causation. 
As recently discussed by Sophie Gibb,11 
the idea of the causal efficacy of mental 
events is contrasted by the so-called causal 
exclusion argument, which has been defended 
among others by Kim12 and Papineau.13 The 
argument moves from the fact that the follo-
wing four claims are each individually plau-
sible, but inconsistent if taken altogether: 
 
(1) Relevance: Mental events are causally rel-
evant in the physical domain. 
 
(2) Closure: Every physical effect has a suffi-
cient physical cause. 
 
(3) Exclusion: There is no systematic causal 
overdetermination. 
 
(4) Distinctness: Mental events are not physi-
cal events. 
 
According to the causal exclusion argu-
ment, from the conjunction of (2) and (3) 
follows that, if we wish to maintain (1), we 
ought to reject (4). In other words: if mental 
events are causally relevant (relevance), if 
every physical effect has a sufficient physical 
cause (closure), and if there is no systematic 
overdetermination (exclusion), then mental 
events are identical with physical events (ne-
gation of distinctness). 
A similar objection has been raised by Kim 
to the theory of emergent mental properties. 
In Making Sense of Emergence, Kim argues that 
emergent properties are necessarily epiphe-
nomenal. If all physical effects have sufficient 
physical causes, and no physical effects are 
caused twice over by distinct physical and 
mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible 
mental causes. Therefore, if emergent proper-
ties are irreducible to their constituters (dis-
tinctness) and they are causally efficacious (re-
levance), then physical effects have both a 
physical and a mental cause. But these multi-
plication of causes is useless, and therefore 
physical events end up being causally overde-
termined (which is in contrast with exclusion). 
On the other hand, if emergent irreducible 
properties have no causal efficacy, then they 
are epiphenomenal.14 
The conclusion that mental causes are 
identical with physical causes is incompatible 
with the idea that mental events are causally 
relevant by themselves, so that the source 
models of control come across the following 
problem: in a deterministic world, not only 
can the subject not do otherwise, but she also 
has no autodetermination, for mental events 
are not causally determining her actions.15 
There are at least four different ways to 
dodge the conclusion of the causal exclusion 
argument.16 The first is to deny relevance, by 
claiming that mental events are not causally 
relevant in the physical domain. This strate-
gy results in eliminativism, epiphenomena-
lism, or non-interactive dualism. Another 
possibility is to reject closure, hence embra-
cing a form of interactive dualism (or causal 
pluralism). Another one is to deny or rephra-
se exclusion. Many forms of non-reductive 
physicalism try to do just this, putting the 
emphasis on the metaphysical relationship 
(of supervenience, constitution, grounding, 
emergence, etc.) between mental and physi-
cal events, claiming that mental events are in 
some way irreducible to physical events. Fi-
nally, following the causal exclusion argu-
ment, reductive physicalism simply denies 
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distinctness. 
However, the solutions just described 
might not be the only ones. Gibb suggests 
that the four claims might be consistent alto-
gether, if mental events aren’t described as 
causes of physical events, but rather only as 
enabling conditions.17 In order to argue in fa-
vour of the causal relevance of mental events 
Gibb proposes an analogy between mental 
causation and physical double prevention.18 
 
█ Causal closure and double prevention 
 
Interesting issues concerning the metaphy-
sics of causation emerge if one considers double 
prevention. Cases of double prevention involve 
the prevention of a prevention, i.e. cases in 
which a physical effect, which would have been 
prevented by a preventer, is carried out because 
a further (double) preventer prevents the first 
preventer from preventing the effect. 
Consider the following example offered 
by Gibb:19 in order to win a prize at a 
fairground, a player named Fred throws a 
ball aiming to break a bottle. However, the 
game is rigged: the bottle is protected by a 
barrier, which prevents the ball from hitting 
the bottle. A button controls the removal of 
the barrier. Sally, who is running the 
fairground attraction, suddenly takes pity on 
Fred, and activates the button. Therefore, 
the pressing of the button by Sally prevents 
the barrier from preventing the breaking of 
the bottle caused by the hit of the ball thrown 
by Fred. The question raised by Gibb is 
therefore: is the pressing of the button (i.e. 
the double preventer) a cause of the breaking 
of the bottle? 
According to the leading theory of causa-
tion among contemporary analytic metaphy-
sicians – Lewis’ counterfactual dependence 
theory of causation20 – double prevention is a 
form of causation. However, Mumford and 
Anjum have argued that if double prevention 
is causation, then a series of counterintuitive 
implications arise.21  
First, it would follow that causation 
would not be an intrinsic matter, i.e. a pro-
cess regarding only the causal relata, but it 
would involve all the conditions that allow 
the causal process to take place. Second, if 
double prevention is a form causation then 
cause and effect need not be connected by a 
continuous chain of events, since causation 
as double prevention relies upon a “non-
event”, namely the merely possible preventi-
on that would have impeded the effect. 
Connectedly, causation by double prevention 
would imply that there can be causation by 
absence, i.e. that the mere absence of some-
thing can actually be causally powerful. Final-
ly, it would entail that there can be causation 
at a distance. In fact, cases could be imagined 
in which the double preventer is spatiotem-
porally remote. 
Considering the objections to double pre-
vention as a form of causation, one could con-
clude that double preventers are not causally 
relevant. However, Gibb claims that it is pos-
sible to distinguish between the causal role of 
the physical causes (such as the momentum 
and hardness of the ball), which I will call 
causal efficacy, and the causal role of the enab-
ling conditions (such as the removal of the bar-
rier), which I will call causal relevance. There is 
a fundamental difference between causing an 
event (such as in normal causation) and per-
mitting an event to be caused (such as in cases 
of double prevention). A double preventer do-
es not cause the event that it prevents from 
being prevented, but it permits or allows the 
event to be caused.22 
Based on these considerations, a further 
objection to the causal exclusion argument 
comes from the observation that causes are 
not always sufﬁcient for their effects. In the 
bottle example, all the events that are physi-
cal causes of the breaking of the bottle are not 
collectively sufﬁcient for the breaking of the 
bottle, if considered in the absence of the re-
levant enabling conditions. Even if not causal-
ly efficacious, Sally’s pressing of the button is 
causally relevant and it should appear in the 
explanation of why Fred’s ball broke the 
bottle, because it plays the essential role of 
permitting the cause to bring about its effect, 
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which is as important as the role of the cause 
itself. This claim represents a more general 
objection to the formulation of closure, be-
cause if the physical causes are not sufficient 
for the manifestation of their effect, then it is 
not true that every physical effect has a suffi-
cient physical cause. The role of enabling 
conditions is necessary. Given that mental 
evens struggle with causal efficacy, Gibb’s 
proposal is that they might be causally rele-
vant nonetheless as enabling conditions. In 
order to argue for that, Gibb proposes a the-
ory of mental double prevention. 
 
█ Free won’t as double prevention: Critical 
remarks 
 
Double preventers might be causally rele-
vant even if not causally efficacious. Accord-
ing to Gibb, this fact could be useful to prove 
the causal relevance of mental events. Hence, 
she draws an analogy between double preven-
tion, mental causation, and free will, accord-
ing to which Libet’s theory of free won’t can be 
revived using the concept of double preventi-
on.23 A mental event doesn’t directly cause a 
bodily movement, but permits a certain bodily 
movement to take place by allowing a neural 
event to cause that bodily movement. Even if 
not a cause, the mental event is causally rele-
vant because it permits the causal relation by 
preventing a mental event that would have 
prevented the causal chain from the neural 
event to the bodily movement. 
To see this, consider the following examp-
le:24 in Fred’s brain a neural event, call it n1, 
corresponds to a mental event m1, the desire 
to grab the beer on the table, and n1 causes 
the bodily movement b1, raising his arm to 
grab the beer on the table. To do so, n1 causes 
an intermediate neural event n2, correspon-
ding to the motor preparation that leads to b1 
(grabbing the beer). In this scenario the two 
neural events n1 and n2 constitute the com-
plete cause of b1. However, in Fred’s mind 
there is also a contrasting mental event m2, 
the desire to grab the remote control, which 
could prevent the behaviour b1. 
According to Gibb, m1 is not a cause of b1, 
but it is nonetheless causally relevant because it 
enables n2 to cause b1, by preventing m2 from 
preventing b1. In other words: m1 is the mani-
festation of the subject’s ability to veto m2. 
In the physical case, the analysis of double 
prevention as causally relevant (even if not as 
a form of causation) is straightforward and 
convincing. However, problems emerge when 
double prevention is used in the context of 
psychophysical interaction. In Gibb’s examp-
le, every mental event M is linked with a neu-
ral event N, and the causal relevance of m1 is 
defined as its ability to prevent m2 from pre-
venting n2 to cause b1. But it should be no-
ticed that on the main picture there is no 
symmetrical correspondence between the 
psychophysical pair of events (m1, n1) and the 
psychophysical pair of events (m2, n2): while 
n1 is the neural event corresponding to the 
mental event m1 (the desire to grab the beer), 
n2 is the intermediate neural event that 
brings about the behaviour b1 (the motor 
preparation to grab the beer), and not the 
neural event corresponding to m2 (the con-
trasting desire to grab the remote).  
It should be stressed that if in Fred’s mind 
there is the contrasting desire m2, there 
should be in Fred’s brain a contrasting neural 
event, call it n1*, corresponding to the desire 
to grab the remote m2, and consequently a 
neural event n2*, corresponding to the inter-
mediate neural event (i.e. motor preparation 
to grab the remote) that brings about the be-
haviour b2. 
Given this picture of the psychophysical 
events involved in the decision, it could be 
argued against Gibb that in causing the in-
termediate event n2 to cause b1, n1 does not 
only play the role of causing the behaviour b1, 
but it prevents also the neural event n2* from 
preventing n2 to cause b1. As in the previous 
example of the bottle and the barrier, physi-
cal events, and more precisely neural events 
in this case, are completely sufficient to ex-
plain double prevention, so that there is no 
need for mental events to be causally rele-
vant, not even as enabling conditions. 
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To show why this is the case it is suffi-
cient to appeal one more time to the princip-
le of exclusion. The principle claims that the-
re is no systematic causal overdetermination, 
and for the same reasons why there should be 
no systematic overdetermination of causal 
efficacy, there should be no systematic over-
determination of causal relevance. But this 
seems to be the case in the above example, 
because for every mental double preventer 
which could be judged causally relevant for 
the physical effect as a necessary enabling 
condition, there is systematically a set of cor-
responding physical (neural) events that are 
causally relevant as necessary enabling condi-
tions (i.e. the physical double preventers), 
which alone are sufficient to explain the ma-
nifestation of the effect. 
These objections can be summarised in 
the following argument, which I will call the 
causal irrelevance argument: 
 
(1) If mental events are not identical to phys-
ical events, then they are not causally rel-
evant (causal exclusion argument)25 
 
(2) There are mental double preventers26 
 
(3) Double prevention is not a form of causa-
tion27 but double preventers are causally 
relevant (as enabling conditions)28 
 
(4) Mental events are causally relevant29 
 
However 
 
(5) Mental double preventers systematically 
overdetermine physical double preventers 
 
(6) There is no systematic overdetermination 
(of causal relevance) (exclusion) 
 
(7) Mental events are causally irrelevant 
 
Gibb’s argument for the causal relevance 
of mental events (and against the causal 
exclusion argument) involves propositions 
(1) to (4). The causal irrelevance argument 
consists in contrasting this conclusion with 
objections (5) & (6), to reach the conclusion 
that mental events are not only causally 
inefficacious, but also causally irrelevant (7). 
Since Gibb’s proposal is explicitly connec-
ted with Libet’s theory of free won’t, it 
should be noticed that the objection that I 
propose against Gibb’s model is analogous to 
the objection to Libet’s original argument, 
only translated to the metaphysical ground. 
Libet’s theory of free won’t was contrasted 
with the conceptual counterargument that, if 
the subject’s decision to move is related to 
specific brain processes that are initiated be-
fore and determine the decision itself, then 
there is no reason to think that the decision 
not to move (or the decision to veto the deci-
sion to move) would not be related to specific 
brain processes that are initiated before and 
determine this decision as well. 
Moreover, recent neuroscientific evidence 
supports this objection. According to Brass 
and Haggard, Libet could not find any identi-
fiable neural correlate of the veto process, 
and therefore he suggested that it could in-
volve a form of downward causation.30 They 
conducted an experiment to test this hypo-
thesis and their study shows a significant role 
of the dorsal fronto-median cortex (dFMC, 
Brodmann’s area 9) in intentional inhibition 
of action.  
For the authors, given the results of their 
experiment, Libet’s free won’t hypothesis 
becomes unnecessary, because the data iden-
tify a clear neural basis for inhibiting inten-
tions and thus show that there is a specific 
neural correlate of the veto process. This 
could be seen as an experimental confirmati-
on of the conceptual hypothesis that, since 
the initiation of action is unconscious, there 
is no reason to think that the initiation of in-
hibition should follow different rules.31 
 
█ Conclusions 
 
Mental causation is the central issue of 
the problem of free will. Gibb’s approach to 
mental causation based on double prevention 
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is original and worth exploring for different 
reasons. First, double prevention is relevant 
for the debate on causation in general. In 
fact, as we have seen, the counterfactual de-
pendence theory of causation32 encounters 
many problems when applied to such cases. 
An account based on the distinction between 
causes and enabling conditions would likely 
prove more satisfying. Second, an account of 
mental causation based on double prevention 
seems to be an original and fruitful way of 
approaching the causal exclusion argument. 
In particular, the formulation of the principle 
of closure, which claims that every physical 
effect has sufficient physical causes, might be 
criticized, since cases of double prevention 
show that physical causes are not always suf-
ficient for their effect in the absence of rele-
vant enabling conditions. 
Nevertheless, drawing upon double pre-
vention to account for the causal relevance of 
mental events is not unproblematic. Limiting 
the causal relevance of mental events to their 
enabling role of physical effects might avoid 
the objection of epiphenomenalism or causal 
overdetermination raised against the causal 
efficacy of mental events. However, a similar 
objection of overdetermination could be cas-
ted upon the enabling role of mental events 
as well.  
The causal exclusion argument might be 
reformulated against the causal relevance of 
mental events in the form of the causal irrele-
vance argument. Its main objection is that as 
long as mental events are linked with physi-
cal events, both the causal role and the enab-
ling role of double preventers can be explai-
ned exclusively within the physical domain. If 
mental double preventers systematically over-
determine physical double preventers, and if 
there is no systematic overdetermination of 
causal efficacy (causes) or causal relevance 
(enabling conditions), then mental double pre-
venters must be either identical to physical 
double preventers, or causally irrelevant. 
Finally, even if double prevention might 
not be a useful basis for an account of mental 
causation, weaker perspectives might be 
worth exploring. A sketchy idea is that men-
tal double prevention could serve as a basis 
for a compatibilist theory of free will. If men-
tal events are constantly supervening on 
(grounded on, or constituted by) physical 
events, and if they are systematically overde-
termined by them, then they might not be 
causally relevant, but they might still be rele-
vant in some other respect. This approach 
would be close to Frankfurt’s hierarchical 
mesh compatibilism.33  
The core idea is that freedom is based on 
mental events that are nested within more 
encompassing elements of the self. In parti-
cular, Frankfurt distinguishes between first-
order and second-order desires, and mental 
double preventers in the form of veto proces-
ses may be seen as second-order desires (de-
sires which have as their objects desires of 
the first-order). 
However, Frankfurt’s theory has been 
under intense scrutiny and at least two issues 
have emerged. The first is the hierarchical 
problem, according to which Frankfurt’s the-
ory is incomplete, because as there can be a 
conflict at the level of the subject’s first-order 
desires, there can also be a conflict at the 
higher-order levels.34 The second and more 
serious is the mesh problem, according to 
which how an agent came to have a particu-
lar mesh of first and second-order desires do-
es matter.35  
It is beyond the purpose of this paper to 
propose a detailed account of compatibilism 
based on double prevention. Nonetheless, the-
re are good reasons to think that it seems mo-
re suitable. The concept of mental double pre-
vention is useful for exploring in deeper detail 
the relationship between contrasting mental 
events, especially desires of different orders. 
Sure enough, one of the challenges of a mesh 
account based on double prevention would be 
to face the problems of Frankfurt’s theory, 
and a lot of work has to be done on that. 
In any case, Gibb’s metaphysical account 
of mental causation is a good example of how 
a priori arguments can have a fundamental 
role in advancing research on complex issues 
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such as free will. This path is original and 
promising, and it brings new life to philoso-
phical debate on mental causation. Gibb’s 
work proves that metaphysics still has a fun-
damental role in reflecting on these issues, 
even in an era in which cognitive neuro-
science is literally invading philosophy. The 
approach to the problem of free will based on 
the metaphysical analysis of mental causation 
is probably the most promising, and this di-
rection of research is the one to which this 
paper hopes to contribute. 
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